Iran After Khamenei: A New Order Takes Shape

Iran’s Political Landscape Shifts Following Leadership Transition

Tempatdonasi.com – The Islamic Republic of Iran is navigating a significant political transformation as citizens prepare to lay their late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to rest in Mashhad, a city located in the northeastern portion of the country. This burial ceremony marks the beginning of a new chapter for the nation, one defined by uncertainty and institutional evolution. Meanwhile, Mojtaba Khamenei, the son and designated successor, continues to remain largely out of public sight. He sustained injuries during the American aerial bombardment that claimed his father’s life when hostilities commenced on February 28, 2026.

The younger Khamenei holds the distinction of being the third supreme leader since the 1979 Revolution. His conspicuous absence from official mourning events has drawn considerable attention. This leadership change extends beyond a mere succession at the highest level of government. It represents the culmination of deep institutional shifts that occurred throughout Ali Khamenei’s nearly forty-year tenure.

Reshaping Power Structures

According to political analyst Reza Talebi, the former leader gradually modified the power dynamics within the Islamic Republic.

Unlike Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who established a system after the revolution that rested on revolutionary legitimacy and his personal authority, Ali Khamenei began systematically restructuring that system,

Talebi explained to DW.

Over the past three decades and seven years, the influence of senior clerics and Shiite seminaries regarding major political decisions has progressively weakened. Security institutions, alongside the Office of the Supreme Leader and its associated political and military networks, have grown increasingly dominant, Talebi noted.

Elected Institutions Face New Realities

This institutional transformation has also modified how Iran’s elected bodies function. Presidential elections have gradually become competitions held within a predetermined political framework. While presidents from various political factions managed to advance their domestic agendas, they possessed limited flexibility in strategic domains including foreign policy, nuclear matters, and regional engagement, according to Talebi.

During the six-day state mourning period for Ali Khamenei, none of the three living former presidents—Hassan Rouhani, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Mohammad Khatami—appeared together with other prominent political figures. Official photographs instead highlighted representatives of the security apparatus, particularly Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders, along with current President Masoud Pezeshkian.

Pezeshkian is widely thought to maintain a close working relationship with Mojtaba Khamenei. He served as a central figure in negotiations designed to conclude the Iran war. The conflict, which started on February 28 with coordinated American and Israeli attacks, ended nearly six weeks later with a fragile ceasefire. This led to a diplomatic process that Mojtaba Khamenei ultimately endorsed.

Diplomatic Breakthrough and Strategic Positioning

Before his approval, Mojtaba Khamenei reportedly held a different stance according to a statement attributed to him and distributed by state media.

The statement said that he agreed to the negotiations after President Pezeshkian, acting as chairman of the Supreme National Security Council, assured him that he would “safeguard the rights of the Iranian people and the interests of the Axis of Resistance.”

Alongside Pezeshkian, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf—a former IRGC commander and current parliament speaker—contributed significantly to discussions with the United States. On June 14, 2026, Washington and Tehran reached agreement on a draft Memorandum of Understanding intended to form the foundation for broader negotiations.

However, following recent tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, US President Donald Trump expressed uncertainty about the continuation of talks with Tehran, while keeping his subsequent actions ambiguous. Hamidreza Azizi, a political scientist focusing on Iranian foreign and security policy, wrote on X:

“Iran interprets Article 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding to mean that the phrase ‘the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements’ gives Iran the sole authority to establish the necessary conditions for reopening the passage [Strait of Hormuz].”

Tehran considers control over the Strait of Hormuz among its most valuable strategic assets. Consequently, Iran seeks to prevent alternative shipping corridors—such as those traversing Omani waters and involving American or international entities—from being established without Tehran’s consent. The IRGC has been instrumental in this escalating confrontation.