Does Indonesia Need a Dedicated Espionage Law?

Indonesia Weighs a New Legal Shield Against Covert Foreign Operations

Tempatdonasi.com – As geopolitical rivalries intensify across the Indo-Pacific and the tools of statecraft migrate from open diplomacy into digital channels, Indonesian policymakers and security scholars are pressing for a standalone statute that would define, deter, and punish espionage and foreign interference on home soil. The proposal marks a departure from decades of relying on scattered regulations to address what analysts now describe as a far more diffuse and technologically enabled threat landscape.

The push for dedicated legislation gained momentum after intelligence and strategic affairs analyst Muhammad Arbani warned that modern espionage no longer fits neatly inside the boundaries of traditional spy work. Foreign actors, he argued, can now operate through student-exchange pipelines, social-media influence campaigns, and data-collection operations that leave no conventional footprint. Without a law that explicitly names these activities, Indonesia risks operating in a legal vacuum precisely where the most subtle forms of interference occur.

“An espionage and foreign interference law is actually something new. We have never had such a law. This is dangerous because espionage can now be conducted covertly,” Arbani said in a statement received in Jakarta on Tuesday.

Why the Gap Matters Now

Indonesia’s position at the crossroads of maritime trade routes, its status as the world’s largest archipelagic state, and its role as ASEAN’s most populous member make it a natural target for both economic and informational influence operations. Arbani pointed to embargoes and trade-pressure tactics as examples of how foreign interference can reach into the economic sphere, while also flagging cyberspace as a front where disinformation, post-truth narratives, and propaganda function as instruments of hybrid warfare.

He stressed that existing Indonesian statutes — covering intelligence operations, information security, personal-data protection, and general cyber-activity — each address a narrow slice of the problem. None, he contended, assembles a unified legal architecture aimed specifically at foreign espionage, influence operations, and cyber-espionage as a coherent category of conduct.

“An espionage and foreign interference law is urgently needed to prevent such activities. This also applies to cyberspace, where foreign interference can enter,” he said.

Scope of the Proposed Statute

Arbani outlined a broad legislative canvas. Rather than limiting the law to the capture of individual agents, he argued it should codify definitions for the illegal gathering of strategic information, the recruitment of domestic agents, formal or informal relationships with foreign principals, influence operations targeting public opinion, and technology-mediated espionage. In his framing, the statute would serve as the single reference point for prosecutors, courts, and oversight bodies whenever a question of foreign covert activity arises.

“The law should become a legal-legal framework governing the definition of espionage and foreign interference, relationships with foreign principals, illegal collection of strategic information, agent recruitment, influence operations and digital espionage,” he said.

At the same time, Arbani cautioned that the statute must embed safeguards so it does not drift into a tool for silencing dissent. Journalism, academic inquiry, and ordinary civil liberties, he insisted, require explicit protection within any such framework.

“Strengthening the legal framework must maintain a balance between national security, democracy and citizens’ rights,” he said.

The Intelligence Agency’s Position

National Intelligence Agency (BIN) Chief Gen. (Ret.) Muhammad Herindra has echoed the call for stronger legal infrastructure. Speaking at a seminar titled “Sovereignty on the Front Line: National Policy on Countering Espionage and Foreign Interference,” hosted by the ASEAN Study Center at the University of Indonesia’s Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Herindra described espionage and foreign interference as operational realities that Indonesia can no longer treat as hypothetical.

He noted that certain covert activities occupy what he called a “gray area,” falling between existing statutes and therefore difficult to prosecute or even formally investigate under current rules. Clear regulations, he argued, would close that gap and give agencies a firmer mandate to protect strategic national interests.

Herindra added that the proposed legislation should undergo comprehensive study while preserving the equilibrium among state security, democratic norms, and civil liberties. He also urged investment in counterintelligence capabilities and tighter inter-agency coordination so that foreign influence capable of threatening sovereignty or citizen safety can be detected earlier and addressed more decisively.

Broader Implications

For a country of roughly 280 million people navigating simultaneous pressures from great-power competition, domestic political volatility, and rapid digital transformation, the question of whether to enact a dedicated espionage statute is less about catching a handful of foreign agents and more about defining the rules of engagement in an era where influence can be exercised without a single footprint on the ground. The debate now centers on how to draw those rules tightly enough to deter covert operations while leaving sufficient room for open discourse, independent journalism, and the free exchange of ideas that underpin a functioning democracy.