25 Years After 9/11: Al-Qaeda Weakened But Not Gone

Al-Qaeda’s Core Has Diminished, but Its Regional Networks Still Endure

Tempatdonasi.com – A decision by the United States in August 2026 offered a striking reminder of how much the militant landscape linked to al-Qaeda has changed since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Abdullah al-Muhaysini, an extremist preacher once associated with jihadist activity in Syria, was removed from the U.S. Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.

The SDN List targets people and entities whose U.S.-based assets are blocked and with whom Americans are generally prohibited from conducting business. Al-Muhaysini’s removal came alongside the delisting of the Nusra Front and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, reflecting a shift in Washington’s policy toward Syria.

For a movement whose name translates from Arabic as “the base,” al-Qaeda has changed profoundly over the past quarter-century. Its central leadership and ability to organize global attacks have been severely eroded. Yet the organization has not vanished. Its influence has increasingly depended on regional affiliates operating in fragile parts of Africa and Asia.

From Global Attacks to Local Entrenchment

The U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan after 2001, combined with expanded intelligence sharing and police cooperation, damaged al-Qaeda’s central structure. The pressure reduced the group’s room to plan and direct large international operations under its own banner.

“This is largely due to the successful counterterrorism efforts following 2001,” Lars Berger, a professor of terrorism studies at the German Federal University of Administrative Sciences, said.

Berger described the September 11 attacks as a strategic setback for al-Qaeda. The movement did not achieve the broader political upheaval it had anticipated across the Arab world, and the governments it hoped to destabilize were not overthrown as a result of its campaign.

Its best-known leader, Osama bin Laden, was killed in May 2011, almost a decade after the attacks in New York and Washington. In the years that followed, al-Qaeda adapted by placing greater emphasis on locations where armed groups could establish a more durable presence.

“The militia sought out areas where it could establish a permanent foothold, for example in parts of Africa or Yemen,” Berger said.

Weak institutions, overstretched security forces, and unresolved local disputes can create openings for militant groups. Rather than relying principally on highly visible attacks planned from a distant command structure, affiliates have sought influence through local alliances, territorial control, and involvement in community-level conflicts.

African and Asian Affiliates Remain Significant

Today, Africa is especially important to the broader al-Qaeda network. In the Sahel, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, known as JNIM, has become one of its most powerful affiliated movements. The group operates in an environment shaped by insecurity, political instability, and competition among armed organizations.

Niger illustrates that contest. JNIM and the Islamic State’s Sahel Province, or ISSP, compete for territory, recruits, and resources. In June 2026, JNIM said it carried out an attack targeting the international airport in Niamey, Niger’s capital.

Other affiliated or closely linked groups retain strong positions elsewhere. Al-Shabab remains a major force in Somalia and has longstanding ties to al-Qaeda. In Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, commonly known as AQAP, continues to represent the organization’s presence on the Arabian Peninsula. Afghanistan, meanwhile, remains a location where the network can find refuge.

Rudiger Lohlker, professor emeritus of Islamic studies at the University of Vienna, said the resilience of these groups cannot be understood through ideology alone. Armed movements can also exploit the financial incentives created by instability and criminal activity.

“Violence including kidnappings, smuggling and looting has long been an economic factor for terrorism,” Lohlker said.

He described environments where armed coercion generates income as “markets for violence.” In such settings, militant organizations may find it easier to attract followers, retain fighters, and finance their operations. This helps explain why the strength of a regional affiliate may rest as much on local conditions as on loyalty to a distant ideological center.

Localization Has Become a Survival Strategy

Al-Qaeda’s affiliates have increasingly pursued a localized approach. Berger characterized the evolution as a move away from attacks against a “distant enemy” and toward the creation of local structures that can survive over time.

“We are now seeing an attempt to proceed in an alternative and gradual manner, namely instead of spectacular acts of violence ordered from the highest levels, there are smaller-scale actions that are more grassroots in nature,” he said.

In the Sahel, that can mean building relationships within communities, taking advantage of ethnic and social tensions, and asserting authority over particular areas. This process is sometimes described as localization: a militant group becomes more closely connected to the conflicts, grievances, and power structures of the places where it operates.

The approach also makes al-Qaeda harder to assess through a narrow focus on its original leadership. A weakened core does not automatically mean that every affiliate is weak. Regional groups may develop their own priorities, sources of funding, recruitment methods, and relationships with local populations.

Lohlker has argued that a Eurocentric view can obscure this reality. Al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations have long had a far larger presence outside Europe and the United States than public attention in Western countries may suggest. For communities living with violence in the Sahel, Somalia, Yemen, or Afghanistan, the issue is not simply the legacy of 9/11 but the continuing effects of armed groups embedded in local crises.

Twenty-five years after the attacks that placed al-Qaeda at the center of global security concerns, the organization is no longer the centralized force it once appeared to be. Its continued relevance lies in its ability to evolve through regional networks. Countering that threat therefore requires attention not only to militant ideology and military pressure, but also to the political instability, local conflicts, and illicit economies that allow armed groups to endure.